Lawyers, Schools, and Access A History of Special Education in the United States Part I:Watson,Beattie,and exclusion

Good evening, I’m Abe Shapiro and this is Disabulletin, where we cover the top stories impacting the disability community across the country and around the world. Tonight, we begin the first leg of an adventure covering the history of Special Education Law in the United States.

This is the next chapter in Disabulletin’s continuing coverage of the recent Supreme Court case Perez V Sturgis. To hear more about the case, you can find our previous episodes on WFHB.Org, just type Disabulletin in the search bar.

Tonight, we take you back to the year 1893. The Chicago World’s fair is in full swing, and on September 20 of that year, Charles and Frank Duryea successfully test the first ever gasoline-powered automobile on the streets of Springfield, Massachusetts. Despite these achievements in technology and national pride, special education is taking a step back an hour and a half away on Pemberton Street in Boston, Massachusetts. In its newly built granite shrine of justice, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts led by Chief Justice Marcus Perrin Knowlton hands down a decision in its latest case, Watson V Cambridge.

The case dates back to 1885 when the plaintiff “was excluded from the schools because he was too weak-minded to derive profit from instruction.” In his decision, Chief Justice Knowlton goes on to write that based on testimony given by the child’s teachers and physicians,

“…he was so weak in mind as not to derive any marked benefit from instruction and further that he is troublesome to other children, making unusual noises, pinching others etc. He is also found unable to take ordinary decent care of himself.“

Although the court did not rule on the city of Cambridge’s request to exclude the student, the final decision was turned over to a jury which was asked, according to Knowlton’s decision, “whether or not the plaintiff’s presence in school was a serious disturbance to the general order and discipline of the school and whether the final decision of a school district was final or could be overturned by a court.”

We do not hear about the Jury’s decision after this, only that it appears the Massachusetts Court gave the final say,  stating that so long as the school districts [committees] act in the “good faith” of schools, such a decision was therefore up to them and if “answered honestly…a jury composed of men of no knowledge in deciding education issues should not be permitted to say their answer is wrong.”

In other words, the court ruled that the school district had the final say in all matters.  This affirmed the court’s original rulings in a case that took place 23 years prior, Hodgkins V Rockport, which first argued school districts were acting in the good faith of their schools by excluding children who were hindering the functioning of the school.

We now move ahead in time and across the country. We’re in Antigo, Wisconsin in the year 1919. Prohibition of alcohol is ratified by the US Congress and the Paris Peace Conference convenes to discuss the negotiations of Germany post-WWI, spurred on by US President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points and the right of all nations to self-determination. But just as the US congress rejected this philosophy, so too did the Langdale County Municipal reject 13-year-old Merritt Beattie’s right to attend public school alongside non-disabled students. As a graduating senior at Indiana University, I covered the historical timeline of special education law in my History senior thesis, one of the cases cited was Beattie V Antigo Board of Education.  Beattie, a 13-year-old student, had been removed from school by the Antigo Wisconsin Board of Education.  According to testimony, Merritt lacked the “normal use and control of his voice, hands, feet, and body.” Other challenges included “uncontrollable facial contortions, making it difficult for him to be understood.” The Antigo Board of Education argued that Beattie’s differences created ”a depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children; that by reason of his physical condition he takes up an undue portion of the teacher’s  time and  attention,  distracts  the  attention  of  other  pupils, and interferes generally with the discipline and progress of the school.” In spite of  those obstacles, Merritt managed to keep up with his classmates from first to fifth grade, after which he was transferred to the City’s school for children who were Deaf or who had “defective speech.” He was then placed back in a public school after five weeks in the fall of 1916, why such a decision was made is not explained.

After a State Education representative visited Merritt’s school and observed him in class, she recommended he be placed back in the deaf program, which he declined. Merritt’s parents appealed this decision to the Antigo Board of Education, which held a meeting to determine if Merritt could return to public school. Despite one member’s motion to reinstate the boy, this was not seconded by the board. A local court then took on the case, where a jury ruled in favor of reinstating Merritt. Justice Walter C. Owen of The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the school district’s right to exclude Merritt Beattie writing,

“the right of a child of school age to attend the public schools of this state cannot be insisted upon when its presence therein is harmful to the best interests of the school.” Owen then said the question at hand was who is responsible for deciding whether such a student can be removed, the courts or the School District? Based on Owen citing a state law confirming the school board’s right to transfer students from one department to another for their “good order and advancement” and Merritt’s “presence being harmful to the school’s welfare”, the district had the right to exclude him, even if it was “displeasing and painful to them.”

However, fellow Justice Franz Eschweiler disagreed with his colleague on the grounds that a Jury had found “no evidence that as a fact this boy’s presence did have any harmful influence on the other children.” Eschweiler also argued that the school board had no “exclusive power’ and that such a decision by the board violated the state constitution’s goal to ” secure to every child a substantial and fundamental right to attend the common school.” Therefore, the school district’s right to transfer Merritt was unconstitutional. Regardless of Eschweiler’s disagreement, the court permitted Merritt’s expulsion.

Next week, the scales of justice begin to tip as we travel to the 1930s, where Parents in Ohio began to grow frustrated over their children’s being denied an equal opportunity to education because of their disability, inspiring others across the country to mobilize.